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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880104-CA 
v. : 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Apellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Sec. 78-29-3 (f) Utah Code 
Annotated. The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of Issuing a 
Bad Check or Draft Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated, a Felony of 
the Third Degree in the Second Judicial District Court, in and 
for Davis County, State of Utah, November 4, 1988. Defendant was 
sentenced December 6, 1988 and an appeal was filed December 22, 
1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1- Whether or not it was prejudicial error for the 
prosecution to state to the jury in his closing argument that in 
his opinion the Defendant was a dishonest man, and in the opinion 
of a witness who didn't testify that he was a dishonest man. 
2- Whether or not it was prejudicial error to allow the 
prosecution to threaten a witness if she testified. 
3- Whether or not it was prejudicial error for the state to 
question the Defendant as to why he didn't subpoena a certain 
witness. 
4- Whether or not it was prejudicial error to allow bank 
records into evidence that were not part of the charges against 
the Defendant, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions will be 
excerpted as they become relevant in the argument, and provided 
in full in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary hearing was held in the Fourth Circuit Court, 
Layton Department, on September 8, 1988. The Defendant was bound 
over for Trial. A jury trial was held on November 4, 1988, and 
the Defendant was found guilty of issuing a bad check or draft in 
violation of Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated. The Defendant 
was sentenced to prison on December 6, 1988. An appeal was filed 
on December 22, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 1, 1988, Tom Humphries opened a checking 
account with First Security Bank.(T.173). He gave Dorie Stewart, 
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a good friend, $3,600.00.(T.175). He asked Dorie Stewart to 
deposit the money in his checking account because he was working 
10-14 hours a day.(T.174). He received the money from G.A.B. 
Adjusters who represented the Fireman's Fund Insurance.(T.175). 
Thereafter Mr. Humphries wrote numerous checks on that account. 
(T.176, T.177). Mr. Humphries, on June 6, 1988, went to 
Portland, Oregon to handle some business on June 6, 1988.(T.179) 
and came back the middle of August.(T.179). Upon his return he 
learned that Dorie Stewart had used the money and not deposited 
it in his checking account. 
(T.178). Later Mr. Humphries was arrested, a preliminary hearing 
held and then the matter was set for Jury Trial. During the 
Trial, Mr. Humphries called Dorie Stewart to the stand.(T.166). 
Before Defense counsel could begin testimony, the State 
requested the opportunity to Voir Dire Dorie Stewart.(T.168). 
The State threatened Dorie Stewart with prosecution for 
theft.(T.169). Then the State advised her that she wouldn't 
have to testify.(T.169) and that if she did testify, those 
things could be used against her.(T.169). Dorie Stewart 
subsequently refused to testify and took the Fifth Amendment. 
(T.171). In closing argument, the State told the jury that 
Dorie Stewart, "didn't want to lie, but she also didn't want to 
tell the hard truth and that is, that this man is dishonest". 
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(T.217). The prosecutor then went on to give his personal 
opinion, "That the defendant is a dishonest person"(T.212) and 
to "disregard the testimony of the defendant because of his 
dishonesty"(T.227). After the prosecutor gave his opinion 
of what Dorie Stewart would state under oath, even though he 
successfully intimidated her so she didn't testify, the jury 
found Mr. Humphries guilty as charged. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial of Defendant was fraught with error. It is a well 
established legal principal supported by hundreds of Decisions 
that a Trial must be conducted in such a way that no prejudice or 
unfair advantage attaches to either the State or the Defendant. 
The fact that the prosecutor steps forward and gives his opinion 
to the jury that the Defendant is a dishonest man, is enough to 
substantiate prejudice, couple the prosecutor giving his own 
opinion and then giving the opinion of a witness who he prevented 
from testifying and clearly the Defendant was prejudiced beyond 
harmless error. 
Further, the State went beyond the bonds of fair play when 
they clearly intimidated a Defendant's witness into not 
testifying. The State has substantial power that they must use 
carefully, and comments to a witness by the State about filing 
theft charges against her were inappropriate. The Judge should 
have done the questioning and Dorie Stewart should of had the 
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advice of an attorney. What was the purpose of advising her of 
theft charges, when the "alleged" victim was the Defendant and 
he had never expressed a desire to prosecute for the "alleged" 
theft. The prosecution simply intimidated the witness. 
Finally, the verdict should be overturned because the State 
implied the Defendant had a burden of proof in the case, offered 
in evidence. Of other returned checks that Mr. Humphrey had 
written and gave Mr. Humphries an attorney at preliminary hearing 
who had a conflict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTION 
TO STATE TO THE JURY IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT IN HIS 
OPINION THE DEFENDANT WAS A DISHONEST MAN. 
It is a well established rule of law that it is improper for 
a lawyer to assert in closing argument his personal belief or 
opinion as to the guilt of the accused,(88 ALR 3d 463). The 
present case falls under that well established law. The 
prosecutor stated on more than one occasion in his closing 
argument that the Defendant was dishonest. Based on those 
statements the guilty verdict against Thomas R. Humphries should 
be overturned. 
Many states besides Utah support the proposition that 
personal belief or opinion by a prosecutor is improper. The 
opinion or belief has been held improper and the verdict 
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overturned when prosecutors express their opinion or belief in 
many different ways. In Commonwealth v. Gilmore 245 Pa Super 27, 
369 A2d 276 (1976). The court overturned the verdict because the 
prosecutor said "that Commonwealth had given jurors "the truth". 
In Artis v Commonwealth 213 VS 220, 191 SE2d 190(1972) the 
decision was overturned because the prosecutor stated that he 
could never bring to Court a case which was more convincing. See 
also People vs. Rosado 43 App. Div. 2d 916, 352 NYS2d 11,(9174), 
wherein the following statement by the prosecutor was deemed 
improper. "I think I am almost making a fool of myself making a 
summation in the case because the case is open and shut." Another 
case specifically in point is Commonwealth v. Valle 240 Pa. 
Super 411, 362 A2d 1021(1976). In that case the prosecutor 
said: 
"I say to you, if by pleading not guilty that vicious 
guy over there, Martin Valle, says: I didn't do these 
things, then I say to you Martin Valle is a liar"(emphasis 
added). 
There are numerous Western State decisions which hold the 
same proposition. A 1982 Wyoming case reiterated the law when 
they held: 
"It is improper for prosecutors to either vouch for 
their own credibility or to testify as to their own 
personal belief or opinion of matter in controversy." 
Banners v. State 642 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1982). See also 
People v. Loscutoff 661 P.2d 274 (Col. 1983). 
Utah law adopted much the same posture, only preferring to 
use a two prong test, the case law seems to have started in 
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State v, Valdez 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) and has since 
been referred to and used as the standard on several different 
occasions. The most recent reference by the Utah Supreme Court 
seems to be State v. Lafferty 749 P.2d 1239(Utah 1988), 
More specifically the two-part test as outlined in all the 
above cases is stated in State vs. Slowe as follows: 
"Slowe also contends that the prosecutor's 
use of the word fence ,during closing arguments 
amounted to a reversible error. We disagree. 
A prosecutor's comments warrant reversible only 
if (1) the comments call the jury's attention to 
matters the jury was not justified in considering, 
and (2) the jurors were probably influenced by 
the remarks." State vs. Slowe 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985) 
Thus, in order to overturn the present case on Defendant-
Appellant, the Court must determine whether the opinions given by 
the prosecutor were: (1) comments which called the jury's 
attention to matters the jury was not justified in considering, 
and (2) whether those comments probably influenced the 
jury. 
Both parts of-the test are clearly met in the present 
case. The prosecutor was content to state his opinion only once 
in closing argument on Mr. Humphries case. During his 15 minutes 
of closing argument and rebuttal he stated the following: 
"When we began our case in the morning, hours 
of this day, we never told you that the Defendant 
was going to be honest, that he was going to tell 
the truth, or that he had ever told the truth in 
any day of his life" (emphasis added) (T.211) 
"The Defendant is a dishonest person" (T.212) 
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"The only doubt that has been provided hereto 
you today has been possible, fanciful or imaginary. 
Do not dignify it with any more than that in your 
deliberations" (T.217) 
"That is what I ask you to do here today and 
that is to disregard the testimony of the Defendant 
because of his dishonesty." (T.2-27) 
"I've tried to sell you today that the Defendant 
is dishonest". (T.228) 
"That's the statement of a dishonest man and 
the conclusion that you must draw is that the doubt 
before you is not a reasonable one." (T.230) 
Any one of the above opinions of the prosecutor are 
detrimental and damaging to the Defendant, and each on its own 
calls the jury's attention to the prosecutor's opinion that the 
Defendant is dishonest. The prosecutor has absolutely no right 
to give his opinion to the jury because the jury cannot use or 
judge a person's guilt or innocence by that criteria. In this 
case, the prosecutor on several occasions gave his opinion, thus 
satisfying the first test enumerated in State vs. Valdez 
(supra.) Comments were made (prosecutor's opinion) which called 
the jury's attention to matters the jury should not consider. 
The second part of the test, ie, whether or not the comments 
probably influenced the jury. The Defendant Appellant 
respectfully points out that there is no question but what the 
limited burden of probably influencing the jury has been met. 
Because the statements were multiple and because they were made 
by the prosecutor they did influence the jury. The case has the 
prosecutor, the very person by his office, who the jury would 
look to for honesty and integrity, the person who represents the 
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State, ie, the people, and therefore someone who's opinion should 
not be regarded lightly. He stands for law and order, and 
enforcement of our laws, principals we all believe in and hope 
are accomplished. When he states something to the jury, it must 
be done with the up most concern for his office and position. 
His comments, his opinions are by the nature of his office, held 
in high esteem by the jury. 
One statement by the prosecutor to the jury giving his 
opinion that the Defendant is dishonest meet the burden of 
probably influencing them. The prosecutor in this case, however, 
was not content to tell the jury his opinion once. On no less 
than six different occasions, the prosecutor alluded to or 
stated that in his opinion the Defendant was dishonest. As 
stated in State vs. Abu-Isba 685 P.2d 235 (Kan. 1985): 
"Error is committed when prosecutor injects 
his or her personnel opinion into closing arguments." 
There is no question but what the prosecutor made a 
mistake. A mistake that has influenced a jury to find a man 
guilty. The only way to rectify the problem is to rule the 
numerous comments were reversible error. 
The second part of the first point that the Defendant-
Appellant wants to raise with the Court is very similar to the 
prosecutor giving his own opinion. The only difference is that 
not only did the prosecutor give his own opinion about the case, 
but he went on to give the opinion as to what a witness would 
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testify about, when in fact he prevented that witness from 
testifying. Thus, the prosecution in his closing argument gave 
his opinion as to what Dorie Stewart would have stated ;Lf she 
would have testified. 
The closing argument of the prosecutor is filed with 
numerous references to the prosecutors opinion of the Defendant's 
dishonesty. Unfortunately, the prosecutor didn't stop with his 
own opinion, he compounded his errors by giving the opinion of a 
witness who was forced to take the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Dorie Stewart was subpoenaed by the Defendant and was called to 
the stand. After some brief foundational questions, the 
prosecutor asked permission to Voir Dire, wherein the following 
exchange took place: 
Q. Do you understand that if you took money without permission 
from someone, even though that person may have owed you money, 
that could be considered theft? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. That you could be prosecuted for that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has offered you 
any immunity and you could therefore..the things that you say 
here could be used against you? 
A. Uh-huh. (T.169) 
After the above exchange took place, the witness Dorie 
Stewart chose to exercise her Fifth Amendment privilege and not 
to testify(T.170). Despite Dorie Stewart not testifying, the 
prosecutor stated in his closing argument: 
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"We ha d a w it n e s s wh o t oo k t he s t and who said 
nothing. Dorie said nothing. She took the Fifth 
Amendment. What does that mean to you? Don't get 
caught in the trap to think that's an admission on 
her part.. I submit to you that she didn't want to 
hurt her friends here, that her friend had asked 
her to come and testify, gave her a subpoena which 
she couldn't disobey. She had to sit on the stand. 
She wanted to tell the truth, but then she didn't 
want to have to tell the truth. She didn't want to 
lie, but she also didn't want to tell the hard truth 
and that is that this man is dishonest. She took the 
easy way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment." (emphasis 
added- <?. 2*-' —) 
POINT II 
WHETHER. OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW THE PROSECUTION 
The Defendan' has * sy ic-jrory -a d c~nstituH oral ri'TVi+' to 
^ v e i------ ^ Uness-'- •>-) hi-, l.rhalf * ' 'estify 7;.-- i ^ r i^ idc-t t~ : ng 
possibl- : her ft charges, caused thr? ^:mei- • . : ~f us^ r, '.^: lty 
and thereby ;i :>I i * i. ^ g -i>- : t:.\r [:---f -ndan - bas:;: rights. 
T . . ; - : -. ~ " ' • -' H -- -
basic right r -f -» person :;>::uscd ;: » .':.'i:-;. J- - '- ! -
C ode A nn, st a t e s in p ar11 
'-•- 3* : "-I - "he Defendant i s 
ent- itlfed . . 
• . 'iv-'v compulsory process to insure trie 
a" - rrndance cf witnesses in his behalf. '1 
T' - ~^n--! • " • - : n of Utah, A r t i e " - I 3<±c. ° - ^ h e c : 
"In criminal prosecutions. ;.ne accused s:^ .-.! 
have the right....to have compulsory process to 
compel *-he -ut.^ndance of witnesses i. V s v^ 
behalf. '• 
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The Defense cognizant of his constitutional and statutory 
rights subpoenaed Dorie Stewart. Dorie Stewart had been a friend 
of the Defendant since January of 1988 (T.174). The alleged 
issuing of bad checks took place in May, 1988 (T.176) and the 
Witness Dorie Stewart was testifying on November 4, 1988(T.i). 
Dorie, according to Defense Counsel's opening remarks was suppose 
to testify that she was to deposit the money in Tom's account. 
(T.158) Before any testimony could be elicited the prosecutor 
requested and was granted the right to Voir Dive. The following 
took place: 
Q. Do you understand that you have a right against having to 
say anything in court that would indicate that you've done 
anything that's criminal? Do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I'm having to anticipate somewhat some of the things that 
you might be asked to testify about just based upon the 
conversations that I've had from counsel. 
Do you understand that if you took money without 
permission from someone even though that person may have owed you 
that money, that could be considered theft? (Emphasis added) 
A. Yeah. 
Q. That you could be prosecuted for that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has offered 
you any immunity and you could, therefore — the things that you 
say here could be used against you? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, also what the word "perjury" means? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Could you explain to the Court what you understand 
perjury to mean. 
-12-
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Cour-
<.: T" '~l 
were t~ say anything other than the truth? 
Understanding those things, you. understand that if you 
desire net to testify, you can tell counsel or- the Court b^at- -. 
don't want to answers questions? 
Q. Even though, and. that you still want to answer questions 
today? 
A. Yeah. . .' " • 
THE con?" - a ; a yes or no? 
Ti;" <:-\<:-
THE COUP" . . f -n** all of your Voir Dire? 
MR. NAM?A* v-s 
T - • ' 
The p r o s e c u r o r ha<' ii M I ' : ^ h i c a t r n r i. •> , f r e s ? *, T 
theft, ~I'- r ".r --i* .'- e v - n more ^ : : i . :, ; . - r. - -r-tliz-- +ha* 
c *.r-,- , - t - --r * i - \ c an 
m d e e o f i l - c r i - r u r n l ; n a i g e s -tgajfis* y ;.„ So IT.*.- -n- *.*r* - J^nf-s t-n 
r o n v i ' ' r h - ^ . r . t - s s f r . r - n : oC a - - - l - * >^ Judge , H: ^ j ^ r ^ i a " ' 
i , - -;. • * * cj v&
 s 
pi ^ ' ^ r* - - - ? p <-- • _-, v -•! ^ j*. £ ; ' j J , \ J r ; a ' ~ " - * • - 7 ' - -" " 
p r i v i l e g e s . Based on the i n a p p r o p r i a t e q u e s t i o n s by t:he 
p m s e u l o i r i n r i i ' ' " I M ^ . I I I M"fiisti1 t i t^»sfi fy and t h e D e f e n d a n t 
was d e p r i v e d of a co n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . 
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POINT III 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE STATE TO QUESTION 
THE DEFENDANT AS TO WHY HE DID NOT SUBPOENA A CERTAIN WITNESS 
A Defendant has a right to a free and impartial trial, he 
has no burden of proof whatsoever. He can testify or not 
testify, he can call ten witnesses or none. The State has the 
burden, they must present evidence. They must prove the evidence 
against the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
prosecutor's questioning of the Defendant clearly infringed on 
Defendant's privileges and rights, the Defendant chose to take 
the stand and testify, on cross-examination the prosecutor asked 
the Defendant the following: 
Q. Steve is a friend of yours? 
A. A business relationship. 
Q. You didn't ask him to come and testify? 
(T.182) 
Then the prosecutor elicits statements from the Defendant 
about what Dorie Stewart had told him. (Despite the fact that he 
had successfully suppressed her testimony). 
Q. During the period from the 15th of May to the 6th of 
June, when you moved out, did you have daily contact with Dorie? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. She never told you that she deposited the money. 
A. She told me that she deposited the money. 
Q. Then she finally told you over the telephone sometime 
later? 
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A Mo, shr aian t . bne told me uic ••
 t. a Saafici 
that a police officer had come by asking c* jme questions arc 
trying to determine '*•' ; "hry would come back to ask me questions 
is wher T realized t h r sc^-Thin.;: ha'1 hrtpr .'n^i ^i^h f b ^ -v-e^ki ng 
account ^.133) 
La',-. - / prosecutor — * , - . , 
? t e w a r - * , : 
r i ' - : : ~* -' ; ^ ~ r * y'"- >j ' (- • r n ,_ p f, o D - ; 
A Done tcia ire '^HI uumid DI- - . ,-.,.. *., 
- * -< s*:- [ t ~ n 3skina questions . 
guess Tori- heard from Donna 3 laffer thar :ct-cvivc 
Parte: 
r i 
I closing argument, the prosecutor -.aid the following: 
"Co:1 \
 1 • , » hink y -. -ould come up c i h some 
proof t-par you held =in insurance claim with 
- -one when you have three partners to split 
'•oncv. rwc other partners r.o split the money 
wirh -. - - r'ner. r'n,^ . would come and testify 
1 we spiic the nr-'ney with hin cr the insurance 
pany? Even a letter from the insurance company 
certifying "ha- • h^y had given him a settlement 
C • . i . -- . 
"Wc- hnd rt witness who took the stand who said 
hing. Dorie said nothing. She took the 
th Amendment* Vn u does that mean to you? 
Dcn't get caught in the trap tc think that's 
an admission on her part . « , she took the 
easy way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment." 
Tv<^ Nevac-3 rupreme Ccurc had a situation similar to ours and 
"Prosecutors comment in <. losing argument m 
prosecution for forgery, suggesting that it 
was defendants fs burden to produce ;rcof h/ 
explaining absence of wi faesses or "come up 
with something" was ci^arly inaccurate and 
improper" Emerson vs State 64 3 ?. 2d \?Ai (Mev. 1982) 
Other Jurisdictions have also ruled the same way. 
"Comments of prosecutor during closing argument 
regarding defendant's failure to present evidence 
in support of his defense which comments did not 
pertain to punishment were prejudicial and intentional 
making a new trial necessary. Watt v. City of Oklahoma 
628 P.2d 371(Okl. 1981). See also State v. Froats 
615 P.2d 1078 (Or. 1980) where the Court held it was error 
to comment in jury argument on the failure of a witness 
to testify who has validly invoked that privilege (Fifth 
Amendment privilege). 
The prosecutor violated not only the privilege against self 
incrimination but Defendant's right to due process, ie, the right 
of innocent until proven guilty. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW BANK RECORDS 
INTO EVIDENCE THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT 
The Defendant was prejudiced when his checking account 
records, which showed other checks that had not been honored by 
the bank, were given to the jury as evidence even though no 
criminal charges had been filed on the additional checks. The 
checks tainted the jury's view of the Defendant. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 states: 
"Although relevant evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence." 
At trial, Defense counsel objected to admission of all 
checks and records other than those being prosecuted. (T.79) 
The prosecution than proceeded to offer several checks into 
evidence that were not honored by the bank. (T.83, 90, 91, 92, 
93, and 94). There was no purpose in discussing those checks. 
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They were not part of the State's case as provided in the 
information. The only purpose of presenting the checks was to 
prejudice the jury. 
The Defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury hear 
his case. The jury heard evidence of other checks to other 
stores which prejudiced the jury made it hard not to be biased. 
Improper evidence which prejudices the jury is grounds for 
reversible error and the Defendant states the the prejudice in 
this case would be sufficient for a new trial. 
POINT V 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL 
TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT WHEN HE ADMITTED HE HAD A CONFLICT. 
The Defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel. 
Counsel that is free from bias or prejudice. The counsel that 
represented Mr. Humphries at the Preliminary Hearing was the 
prosecutor for Kaysville city and admitted on the record he had a 
conflict of interest. Mr. Humphries did not receive the benefit 
of fair and impartial counsel at the Preliminary Hearing and the 
guilty verdict should be overturned. 
There does not seem to be any question that the attorney who 
represented the Defendant at the Preliminary Hearing had a 
conflict. At the start of the Preliminary Hearing, it was 
established that the arresting officer was a Kaysville officer 
(Preliminary Hearing T.3). That the Defense attorney was 
employed by Kaysville City (Preliminary Hearing T.3). Then 
Defense counsel on the record stated: 
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" At that point in time, I indicated that 
if he wanted to proceed with trial I didn't 
feel like it was appropriate for me to proceed 
with trial since it involved a Kaysville city 
officer. He agreed, and that's where we stand 
now " (emphasis added) (Preliminary Hearing T.4) 
However, Mr. Humphries had a choice of additional time in 
jail or waiving a conflict of interest. A choice a person really 
should not have to make, simply because if a person wants an 
attorney, free of prejudice, it does not mean he should wait in 
jail longer. Counsel of prejudice and bias represented Mr. 
Humphries at the Preliminary Hearing the the jury decision should 
be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant did not received a fair and impartial Trial. 
The Trial was fought with errors. Errors that caused prejudice 
to the Jury. Because the sum total of these errors was 
substantial prejudices, the Jury decision should be reversed. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We will return to the Humphries' 
case, State vs. Humphries, 881000669. Mr. Humphries is 
present under custody, Mr. Cella, his counsel, is present. 
Mr. Namba is present for the State of Utah. This is the time 
set for preliminary examination. 
Mr. Humphries, the Court has been advised 
through counsel that you prefer to have another lawyer, and 
we don't appoint different defense lawyers. You can repre-
sent yourself if you would like, or you can have Mr. Cella 
represent you here this afternoon. Do you have a preference 
about that, sir? 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Well, Your c\onor, there is 
a definite conflict with attorney Cella and myself. 
THE COURT: Would you identify the conflict 
for us? 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Your Honor, attorney Cella 
has told me that he has prosecuted two cases for detective 
Barton and also he is also employed by the City of Layton 
in the capacity of city attorney. 
MR. CELLA: That's not exactly correct, 
Judge, City of Kaysv i 11 e . The investigating officer is 
detective Barton with Kaysville City. 
I, however, had I known ahead of time that 
3 
1 j this was a Kaysville City case, Judge, I would have contacted 
2 | r'lr. (inaudible) and made arrangements. However, I was not, 
3 [ and I don't mean to cast aspersions but I wasn't provided 
4 l with a copy of the police report until I arrived this after-
5 noon and found out that it was a Kaysville City case. And 
6 I at that point, I talked with sir*. Humphries, there was an 
7 arrangement made, a negotiated plea was offered, and I dis-
8 j cussed it with him and he declined to accept a negotiated 
9 I plea. At that point in time, I indicated that if he wanted 
10 to proceed with trial I didn't feel like it was appropriate 
11 for me to proceed with trial since it involved a Kaysville 
12 | City officer. He agreed and that's where we stand now. As 
13 far as the Preliminary Hearing --
14 I Judge, perhaps you can give me some guidance 
15 as to what to do. 
16 THE CuURT: Mr. Namba, let me address 
17 i counsel . Thank you, Mr. Cel 1 a. 
18 Mr. Namba, I will let you go ahead today if 
19 i you want to, but --
20 MR. NAMBA: How long has the Defendant been 
21 | incarcerated? 
22 ! MR, CELLA: Well, he is on another hold. He 
23 | has been in jail since the 31st of August. His release is 
24 t September 15th, and that would have been 16 days in jail. 
25 ! MR. NAMBA: Another problem, Your Honor, is 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
you -- he is in custody ana you have your lU-day problem, 
which Steve just got stuffed by Judge Cornaby. 
MR. CELLA: well, Mr. Humphries has indicated 
a uesire to proceed under what he calls it, a protest, and 
has asked that I represent him at the Preliminary Hearing 
and do it under protest. I don't --
MR. HUMPHRIES: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Let me hear from your lawyer, 
Mr. Humphries, and then I will give you a chance to speak. 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Well, he is saying what I 
said and that is not what I said, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you can tell me that 
that's not what you said when he finishes talking, so please 
allow him to finish. Go ahead, fir. Cella. 
MR. CELLA: We are prepared to go forward 
today, Your Honor. We have no objection to a continuance if 
that is what is desired. The Defendant ought, i think, to 
make the election if he wants to have a Preliminary Hearing 
at a later date. He is not going to be released. If he 
wants to waive the time period, we have no objection to 
coming back at a later time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Humphries, we won't go ahead 
with the Preliminary Hearing today, as you say, under protest. 
As counsel suggested, you are going to have to make an 
election. Either you --
1 ! MR. HUMPHRIES: Your Honor, I don't feel 
i 
2 | that confident to represent myself before this Court, and--
3 j THL COURT: I doubt if you are too. 
4 | IIR. HUMPHRItS: -- there is definitely a 
conflict involved, and I will let the Court make the 
decision. 
THE COURT: You feel you are competent to 
determine trie conflict, however? 
9 I MR. H U M P H R I L S : Yes, sir, definitely. 
10 MR. NAMBA: All our witnesses who will 
11 testify are here, Your Honor, if you wanted to -- if the 
12 j Court wanted to continue it for even a day or two, we could 
13 | just simply give them notice rignt now and so we wouldn't 
14 j have a notice problem and v/e could do it witiiin a couple of 
15 | days if the Court had time to do that. 
16 ( MR. CLLLA: Juuge, furthermore, since ic 
17 j appears to be my conflict -- well, not as it appears, it 
18 j clearly is my conflict and to a certain extent it appears to 
19 
20 
21 
I 
22 
! 
23 j 
i 
24 
25 
be -- I don't want to taKe the full blame for it, but I will 
take a certain amount of blame. If the Court wants to 
assess me witness charges for the witnesses who are here 
today and are not able to testify, that's fine. 
T H L COURT: iio, «ve won't do tnat. If you 
didn't have the police report and know what you were dealing 
with then I don't think that is appropriate. I am inclined 
to go ahead and hear these witnesses and -- but I guess 
if there is any infirmity in cross-examination, if there 
is any conflict, then a conflict exists in the cross-examina 
tion that might be available for another time. 
MR. NAHBA: I am concerned that an unrepre-
sented Defendant who would do cross-examination might make 
an error that would not be reparable. 
THE COURT: Well, I would like the record 
to show that the Defendant is playing games. He told the 
bailiff on the way here to court that he would be back here 
three or four times because he would have a continuance and 
then he went on to further expound that --
MR. HUMPHRIES: Your Honor, may I --
THE COURT: No, you may not interrupt me, 
Mr. Humphries. I will hear from you in a moment. He went 
on to expound that he would have a continuance because he 
knew a way to get one and it seems to the Court that he has 
known about the conflict and was aware of, 1 guess, that 
there was some infirmity and just kept quiet about it, and 
so I would like the record to show that. 
Now, Mr. Humphries, is there something that 
you would like to tell the Court? 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Your Honor, I wasn't really 
aware of it until attorney Cella interviewed ne just a few 
moments ago and told me that he haa actually prosecuted cases 
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for detective Barton. 
THE COURT: Perhaps you could tell us what 
you had in mind when you made the remark to the bailiff on 
the way here. 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Your Honor, the remark that 
I made to the bailiff was as far as being arraigned in 
District Court if I was bound over and then they were going 
to transfer me to Davis County on Friday -- Thursday the 
15th or Friday the 16th. So, therefore, I was letting him 
know that he would have to pick me up quite a few times 
next week. I didn't understand why and I would just like to 
have my sentence served in Davis County so we just could 
get rid of all the transportation problems. 
THE COURT: That explanation doesn't make 
much sense, sir, but it's on the record. So we will at least 
accept it. 
Do you know how soon Mr. Vanderlinden could 
respond to a new setting, Mr. Cella? 
MR. CELLA: If the Court would like, let me 
slip out and see if I can get a hold of his office and 
see how quick we can get him here. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We will 
go off the record for a moment. 
(OFF-THE-RECORD while Mr. Cella made a telephone 
call.) 
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MR. CELLA: How would the Court feel, I can 
have -- fir. Vanderlinden can't appear toaay. I can have 
someone from his office here tomorrow afternoon. I called 
Mr. Cathcart, I can't get him here today. He can appear 
also tomorrow afternoon. 
I've talked with Mr. Humphries, he's -- he 
would like to go ahead and proceed with the Preliminary 
Hearing. I have indicated to him that I could go ahead and 
handle today. However, it would require a waiver from him 
on the record of the conflict and I would only serve as 
counsel for the Preliminary Hearing only. I wouldn't 
represent him, assuming he was bound over, I wouldn't 
represent him any further. He would have another public 
defender or I could obtain private counsel for him. 
THE COURT: All right --
(End of tape 5394.) 
MR. CELLA: Gut he would like to go ahead 
and proceed today so he can find out what is going to happen 
so that he doesn't have to sit in jail waiting until we can 
get another date. Now, is that --
THE COURT: That's agreeable. 
MR. CELLA: I perceive that as being okay 
to cover my bases. 
THE COURT: I think it is. I commend you and 
Mr. Humphries for talking it through and working it out. 
9 
Mr. Humphries, you have heard what your 
lawyer has said. Is that agreeable with you? 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Yes, sir, it is. 
THE COURT: Do you now waive, on the record, 
any conflict between Mr. Cella and any witnesses that may 
be testifying in this matter? 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Yes, sir, on the hearing 
today. 
THE COURT: For today's purposes only. 
MR. HUMPHRIcS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And any other conflict that 
may exist because of his representation of Kaysville City? 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, and we 
will go ahead then. Mr. Manba, you may proceed. We 
are returning to 88100J669, State against Humphries. 
MR. NAMBA: We call Allison Dent. 
ALLISON DENT, 
was called as a witness for 
and on behalf of the Plaintiff 
and testified upon her oath as 
fol1ows : 
MR. CELLA: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes? 
MR. CELLA: Your Honor, I would like to have 
10 
the other witnesses excluded from the courtroom during testi-
mony. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. For all of 
the others in the courtroom who expect to testify in this 
case as a witness for either side, I order you to leave the 
courtroom now and not to discuss your testimony with any 
other witness until after you have given your testimony. 
All right, thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NAMBA: 
Q State your name and your occupation. 
A Allison Dent, I am not employed right now. 
THE COURT: And how do you spell your last 
name, Allison? 
THE WITNESS: D-E-N-T. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Namba) Were you employed by Bowmans? l 
A Yes, I was. i 
Q Okay, and which store were you employed at? 
I 
A The Kaysville store. j 
! 
Q Ana how long were you employed there? j 
A From October until about flay of this last ' 
year, 
Q Okay, and on the 26th or 27th of Hay, during 
that time period, were you employed there? 
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